Abstract. For any pair (X, Z) of correlated random variables we can think of Z as a randomized function of X. Provided that Z is short, one can make this function computationally efficient by allowing it to be only approximately correct. In folklore this problem is known as simulating auxiliary inputs. This idea of simulating auxiliary information turns out to be a powerful tool in computer science, finding applications in complexity theory, cryptography, pseudorandomness and zero-knowledge. In this paper we revisit this problem, achieving the following results: (a) We discuss and compare efficiency of known results, finding the flaw in the best known bound claimed in the TCC'14 paper "How to Fake Auxiliary Inputs". (b) We present a novel boosting algorithm for constructing the simulator. Our technique essentially fixes the flaw. This boosting proof is of independent interest, as it shows how to handle "negative mass" issues when constructing probability measures in descent algorithms. (c) Our bounds are much better than bounds known so far. To make the simulator (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable we need the complexity O s · 2 5ℓ ǫ −2 in time/circuit size, which is better by a factor ǫ −2 compared to previous bounds. In particular, with our technique we (finally) get meaningful provable security for the EUROCRYPT'09 leakage-resilient stream cipher instantiated with a standard 256-bit block cipher, like AES256. Our boosting technique utilizes a two-step approach. In the first step we shift the current result (as in gradient or sub-gradient descent algorithms) and in the separate step we fix the biggest non-negative mass constraint violation (if applicable).
Introduction

Simulating Correlated Information.
Informal Problem Statement Let (X, Z) ∈ X × Z be a pair of correlated random variables. We can think of Z as a randomized function of Z. More precisely, consider the randomized function h : X → Z, which for every x outputs z with probability Pr[Z = z|X = x]. By definition it satisfies (X, h(X))
however the function h is inefficient as we need to hardcode the conditional probability table of Z|X. It is natural to ask, if this limitation can be overcome Q1: Can we represent Z as an efficient function of X?
Not surprisingly, it turns out that a positive answer may be given only in computational settings. Note that replacing the equality in Equation (1) by closeness in the total variation distance (allowing the function h to make some mistakes with small probability) is not enough 1 . This discussion leads to the following reformulated question Q1': Can we efficiently simulate Z as a function of X?
Why it matters? Aside from being very foundational, this question is relevant to many areas of computer science. We will not discuss these applications in detail, as they are well explained in [JP14] . Below we only mention where such a generic simulator can be applied, to show that this problem is indeed wellmotivated.
(a) Complexity Theory. From the simulator one can derive Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08], Impagliazzo's hardcore lemma [Imp95] and a version of Szemeredis Regularity Lemma [FK99] . (b) Cryptography. The simulator can be applied for settings where Z models short leakage from a secret state X. It provides tools for improving and simplifying proofs in leakage-resilient cryptography, in particular for leakageresilient stream ciphers [JP14] . (c) Pseudorandomness. Using the simulator one can conclude results called chain rules [GW11] , which quantify pseudorandomness in conditioned distributions. They can be also applied to leakage-resilient cryptography. (d) Zero-knowledge. The simulator can be applied to represent the text exchanged in verifier-prover interactions Z from the common input X [CLP15] .
Thus, the simulator may be used as a tool to unify, simplify and improve many results. Having briefly explained the motivation we now turn to answer the posed question, leaving a more detailed discussion of some applications to Section 1.6.
1 Indeed, consider the simplest case Z = {0, 1}, define X to be uniform over X = {0, 1} n , and take Z = f (X) where f is a function which is 0.5-hard to predict by circuits exponential in n, Then (X, h(X)) and (X, Z) are at least -away in total variation
Problem Statement
The problem of simulating auxiliary inputs in the computational setting can be defined precisely as follows Given a random variables X ∈ {0, 1} n and correlated Z ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , what is the minimal complexity s h of a (randomized) function h such that the distributions of h(X) and Z are (ǫ, s)-indistinguishable given X, that is
The indistinguishability above is understood with respect to deterministic circuits. However it doesn't really matter for distinguishing two distributions, where randomized and deterministic distinguishers are equally powerful 2 . It turns out that it is relatively easy 3 to construct a simulator h with a polynomial blowup in complexity, that is when
However, more challenging is to minimize the dependency on ǫ −1 . This problem is especially important for cryptography, where security definitions require the advantage ǫ to be possibly small. Indeed, for meaningful security ǫ = 2 −80 or at least ǫ = 2 −40 it makes a difference whether we lose ǫ −2 or ǫ −4 . We will see later how much inefficient bounds here may affect provable security of stream ciphers.
Related Works
Original work of Jetchev and Pietrzak (TCC'14) The authors showed that Z can be "approximately" computed from X by an "efficient" function h.
ℓ and every ǫ, s, there exists a "simulator" h :
The proof uses the standard min-max theorem. In the statement above we correct two flaws. One is a missing factor of 2 ℓ . The second (and more serious) one is the (corrected) factor ǫ −4 , claimed incorrectly to be ǫ −2 . The flaws are discussed in Appendix A.
Vadhan and Zheng (CRYPTO'13) The authors derived a version of Theorem 1 but with incomparable bounds Theorem 2 ( [VZ13] ). For every distribution X, Z on {0, 1} n × {0, 1} ℓ and every ǫ, s, there exists a "simulator" h :
The proof follows from a general regularity theorem which is based on their uniform min-max theorem. The additive loss of O 2 ℓ ǫ −4 appears as a consequence of a sophisticated weight-updating procedure. This error is quite large and may dominate the main term for many settings (whenever s ≪ ǫ −2 ). As we show later, Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 give in fact comparable security bounds when applied to leakage-resilient stream ciphers (see Section 1.6)
Our Results
We reduce the dependency of the simulator complexity s h on the advantage ǫ to only a factor of ǫ −2 , from the factor of ǫ −4 .
Theorem 3 (Our Simulator). For every distribution X, Z on {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} ℓ and every ǫ, s, there exists a "simulator" h :
Below in Table 1 we compare our result to previous works.
Author Technique Advantage Size Cost of simulating
This paper (Theorem 3) Simple Boosting Table 1 . The complexity of simulating ℓ-bit auxiliary information given required indistinguishability strength, depending on the proof technique.
Our result is slightly worse in terms of dependency ℓ, but outperforms previous results in terms of dependency on ǫ −1 . However, the second dependency is more crucial for cryptographic applications. Note that the typical choice is sub-logarithmic leakage, that is ℓ = o log ǫ −1 is asymptotic settings 4 (see for example [CLP15] ). Stated in non-asymptotic settings this assumption translates to ℓ < c log ǫ −1 where c is a small constant (for example c = To illustrate this, suppose we want to achieve security ǫ = 2 −60 simulating just one bit from a 256-bit input. As it follows from Table 1 , previous bounds are useless as they give the complexity bigger than 2 256 which is the worst complexity of all boolean functions over the chosen domain. In settings like this, only our bound can be applied to conclude meaningful results. For more concrete examples of settings where our bounds are even only meaningful, we refer to Table 2 in Section 1.6.
Our Techniques
Our approach utilizes a simple boosting technique: as long as the condition (a) in Theorem 3 fails, we can use the distinguisher to improve the simulator. This makes our algorithm constructive with respect to oracle answers, similarly to other boosting proofs. In short, if we find D such that
where (a) The parameter γ is afixed step chosen in advance (its optimal value depends on ǫ and ℓ and is calculated in the proof.)
This restriction correspond to the fact that we want to preserve the constraint
is a correction term used to fix (some of) possibly negative weights.
The procedure is being repeated in a loop, over and over again. The main technical difficulty is to show that it eventually stops after not so many iterations.
Note that in every such a step the complexity cost of the shifting term is O 2 ℓ · size(D) 6 . In our solution, the correction term does a search over z looking for the biggest negative mass, and redistributes it over the remaining points. Intuitively, it works because the total negative mass is getting smaller with every step. See ?? 1 for a pseudo-code description of the algorithm and the rest of Section 3 for a proof. Jetchev and Pietrzak in [JP14] showed how to use the simulator theorem to simplify the security analysis of the EUROCRYPT'09 cipher. The cipher security depends on the complexity of the simulator as explained in Theorem 1 and Remark 1. We consider the following setting:
-number of rounds q = 16, -F instantiated with AES256 (as in [JP14] ) -cipher security we aim for ǫ ′ = 2 −40
-λ = 3 bits of leakage per round
The concrete bounds for (q, ǫ ′ , s ′ )-security of the cipher (which roughly speaking means that q consecutive outputs is (s ′ , ǫ ′ )-pseudorandom, see Section 2 for a formal definition) are given in Table 2 below. We ommit calculations as they are merely putting parameters from Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 into Remark 1 and assuming that AES as a weak PRF is (ǫ, s)-secure for any pairs s/ǫ ≈ 2 k (following the similar example in [JP14] ). Table 2 . The security of the EUROCRYPT'09 stream cipher, instantiated with AES256 as a weak PRF of rouhgly k = 256 bits of security. In this settngs only our new bounds provide non-trivial bounds.
More generaly, we can give the following comparison of security bounds for different wPRF-based stream ciphers, in terms of time-sccess ratio. The bounds in Table 3 follow from the simple lemma in Section 4, which shows how the time-success ratio changes under explicit reduction formulas.
Cipher Analysis
Proof [JP14] Aux. Inputs Simulator (corr.)
Aux. Inputs Simulator
Pseudoentropy chain rules
λ large public seed (3) [YS13] Square-friendly apps.
λ only in minicrypt Table 3 . Different bounds for wPRF-based leakage-resilient stream ciphers. k is the security level of the underlying wPRF. The value k ′ is the security level for the cipher, understood in terms of time-success ratio. the numbers denote: (1) The EUROCRYPT'09 cipher, (2) The CSS'10/CHESS'12 cipher, (3) The CT-RSA'13 cipher.
Organization
In Section 2 we discuss basic notions and definitions. The proof of Theorem 3 appears in Section 3.
Preliminaries
Basic Notions
Let V be a finite set, and D be a class of deterministic real functions on V. For any two real functions f 1 , f 2 on V, we say that
If D consists of all circuits of size s we say that f 1 , f 2 are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable.
Stream ciphers definitions
We start with the definition of weak pseudorandom functions, which are computationally indistinguishable from random functions, when queried on random inputs and fed with uniform secret key.
Definition 1 (Weak pseudorandom functions). A function
n → {0, 1} m is an (ǫ, s, q)-secure weak PRF if its outputs on q random inputs are indistinguishable from random by any distinguisher of size s, that is
where the probability is over the choice of the random X i ← {0, 1} n , the choice of a random key K ← {0, 1} k and R i ← {0, 1} m conditioned on R i = R j if X i = X j for some j < i.
Stream ciphers generate a keystream in a recursive manner. The security requires the output stream should be indistinguishable from uniform 7 .
Definition 2 (Stream ciphers).
n is a function that need to be initialized with a secret state S 0 ∈ {0, 1} k and produces a sequence of output blocks X 1 , X 2 , ... computed as
A stream cipher SC is (ǫ, s, q)-secure if for all 1 i q, the random variable X i is (s, ǫ)-pseudorandom given X 1 , ..., X i−1 (the probability is also over the choice of the initial random key S 0 ).
Now we define the security of leakage resilient stream ciphers, which follow the "only computation leaks" assumption.
Definition 3 (Leakage-resilient stream ciphers).
A leakage-resilient streamcipher is (ǫ, s, q, λ)-secure if it is (ǫ, s, q)-secure as defined above, but where the distinguisher in the j-th round gets λ bits of arbitrary deceptively chosen leakage about the secret state accessed during this round. More precisely, before (S j , X j ) := SC(S j−1 ) is computed, the distinguisher can choose any leakage function f j with range {0, 1} λ , and then not only get X j , but also Λ j := f j (Ŝ j−1 ), whereŜ j−1 denotes the part of the secret state that was modified (i.e., read and/or overwritten) in the computation SC(S j−1 ).
Security of leakage-resilient stream ciphers.
Best provable secure constructions of leakage-resilient stream ciphers are based on so called weak PRFs, primitives which look random when queried on random inputs ([Pie09,FPS12,JP14,DP10,YS13]). The most recent (TCC'14) analysis is based on a version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (Proving Security of Stream Ciphers
Remark 1 (The exact complexity loss). The inspection of the proof in [JP14] shows that s F equals the complexity of the simulator h in Theorem 1 applied to the class of all circuits of size s ′ , where ǫ is replaced by ǫ ′ .
Time-Success Ratio
The running time (circuit size) s and success probability ǫ of attacks (practical and theoretical) against a particular primitive or protocol may vary. Definition 4 (Security by Time-Success Ratio [LM94] ). A primitive P is said to be 2 k -secure if for every adversary with time resources (circuit size in the nonuniform model) s, the success probability in breaking P (advantage) is at most ǫ < s · 2 −k . We also say that the time-success ratio of P is 2 k , or that is has k bits of security.
For example, AES with a 256-bit random key is believed to have 256 bits of security as a weak PRF 8 .
Proof of Theorem 3
For technical convenience, we attempt to efficiently approximate the conditional probability function Pr[Z = z|X = x] rather than building the sampler directly. Once we end with building an efficient approximation h(x, z), we transform it into a sampler h sim which outputs z with probability h(x, z) (this transformation yields only a loss of 2 ℓ ). We are going to prove the following fact For every function g on X × Z which is a X -conditional probability mass function over Z (that is g(x, z) 0 for all x, z and z g(x, z) = 1 for every x), and for every class D closed under complements 9 there exists h such that (a) h is a X -conditional probability mass function over Z (b) h is of complexity s h = O(2 4ℓ ǫ −2 ) with respect to D (c) (X, Z) and (X, h sim (X)) are indistinguishable, which in terms of g and h means
The sketch of the construction is shown in ?? 1. Here we would like to point out two things. First, we stress that we do not produce a strictly positive function; what our algorithm guarantees, is that the total negative mass issmall. We will see later that this is enough. Second, our algorithm performs essentially same operations for every x, which is why its complexity depends only on Z.
For simplicity (and without losing generality) we assume X = {0, 1} n and Z = {0, 1} ℓ . We also denote for shortness
We consider the security of AES256 as a weak PRF, and not a standard PRF, because of non-uniform attacks which show that no PRF with a k-bit key can have s/ǫ ≈ 2 k security [DTT09] , at least unless we additionally require ǫ ≫ 2 −k/2 . 9 This is a standard assumption in indistinguishability proofs. We can always extend the class by adding −D for every D ∈ D, which increases the complexity only by 1.
Algorithm 1: Construct a Simulator
, accuracy paramter ǫ > 0, class D, step γ output: Function h which is ǫ-indistinguishable from g under D, add up to 1 for every x, and with total negative mass smaller γ|Z|
for every x and z
Proof. Consider the functions h t . Defineh
According to ?? 1, we have
with the correction term θ t,r+1 (x, z) that be computed recursively as (see ?? 1 in ?? 1) This claim describes precisely resources required to compute the function h T for every T . In order to bound T , we define the energy function as follows:
Claim 2 (Energy function). Define the auxiliary function
Then we have ∆ t = E 1 + E 2 where
The proof is based on simple algebraic manipulations and appears in Appendix B.
Remark 2 (Technical issues and intuitions). From Equation (7) it is clear that we need two important properties Proof outline. Indeed, with these assumptions we can prove that
Since in the other hand we have tǫ ∆ t , setting γ = ǫ/poly(|Z) we get that the algorithm terminates after at most T = poly(|Z|)ǫ −2 steps. We stress that it outputs only a signed measure, not a probability distribution. However, because of property (a) the negative mass is only of order poly(|Z|)ǫ and the function we end with can be simply rescaled (we replace negative masses by 0 and normalize the function dividing by a factor 1 − m where m is the total negative mass). With this transformation, we replace the expected advantage O(ǫ) by slightly worse O (poly(|Z|)ǫ). We can then replace ǫ to get a clear dependency. Finally, we need to remember that we construct only a probability distribution function, not a sampler. Transforming it into a sampler yields an overhead of O(Z). This discussion shows that it is possible to build a sampler of complexity poly(|Z|)ǫ −2 . A more carefull inspection of the proof shows that we can actually achieve |Z| 5 ǫ −2 .
Technical Discussion We note that condition (b) somehow means that mass cuts should go in the right direction, as it is much simpler to prove that ?? 1 terminates when there are no correction terms θ t ; thus we don't want to go in a wrong direction and ruin the energy gain. Concrete bounds on properties (a) and (b) are given in Claims 3 and 4.
In ?? 1 in every round we shift only one negative point mass (see ?? 1). However, since this point mass is chosen to be as big as possible and since h t+1 and h t differ only by a small term γ · D t+1 except the mass shift θ t+1 , one can expect that we have the negative mass under control. Indeed, this is stated precisely in Claim 3 below.
Claim 3 (The total negative mass is small). Let NegativeMass(h t (x, ·)) = − z min(h t (x, z), 0) be the total negative mass in h t (x, z) as the function of z. Then we have
for every x and every t.
The proof is based on a recurrence relation that links NegativeMass(h t+1 (x, ·) with NegativeMass(h t (x, ·), and appears in Appendix C.
Claim 4 (The angle formed by the correction and the difference vector is acute).
For every x, t we have Angle θ 
Time-success ratio under algebraic transformations
In Lemma 1 below we provide a quantitative analysis of how the time-success ratio changes under concrete formulas in security reductions.
Lemma 1 (Time-success ratio for algebraic transformations). Let a, b, c and A, B, C be positive constants. Suppose that P ′ is secure against adversaries (s ′ , ǫ ′ ), whenever P is secure against adversaries (s, ǫ), where
In addition, suppose that the following condition is satisfied A C + 1.
Then the following is true: if P is 2 k -secure, then P ′ is 2 
The proof is elementary though not immediate. It can be found in [Sko15] .
Remark 3 (On the technical condition (10)). This condition is satisfied in almost all applications, at in the reduction proof typically ǫ ′ cannot be better (meaning higher exponent) than ǫ. Thus, quite often we have A 1.
